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I. CREATION, ALTERATION, EXISTENCE
AND DISSOLUTION
HE Fort Worth Court of Appeals, in In re Spiritas Ranch Enter-
prises, L.L.P., held that Spiritas Ranch Enterprises, L.L.P. ("Spir-
itas") was entitled to mandamus relief to decide whether a
temporary restraining order ("TRO") had been properly issued regarding
the proposed annexation of Spiritas's property.'
In October 2006, the Town of Little Elm ( "Little Elm") sent written
notice to certain landowners of undeveloped property of its intent to an-
nex their land. 2 In November 2006, Spiritas responded and asked "that
its property be included in [Little Elm's] three-year annexation plan
rather than" its fast-track annexation plan.3 However, in December 2006,
the Little Elm Town Council voted to retain Spiritas's property in the
fast-track annexation plan.4 Spiritas then requested to arbitrate the issue,
pursuant to authority granted by section 43.052(i) of the Texas Local
Government Code.5 Spiritas filed suit against Little Elm on the day
before the town council was scheduled to consider an agenda item that
"appeared to allow the [c]ouncil to vote on whether Spiritas's property
should be annexed before considering Spiritas's request to arbitrate the
matter."
6
Spiritas's lawsuit asked for a declaratory judgment, a temporary and
permanent injunction, as well as a TRO.7 The TRO was denied following
a hearing with testimony from both parties.8 The next day, Spiritas filed a
mandamus action, seeking "to compel the trial court to reverse its order
denying the TRO" and to preclude Little Elm from annexing Spiritas's
property "until the trial court could determine the merits of Spiritas's
* B.S., Georgetown University; M.B.A., University of California, Berkeley; J.D.,
University of California, Berkeley.
1. In re Spiritas Ranch Enterprises, L.L.P., 218 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2007, no pet.).
2. Id. at 892.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. (citing TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 43.052(i) (Vernon 2008)).




temporary injunction request."9 An order granting Spiritas's motion for
emergency temporary relief was granted by the court of appeals.' 0 Little
Elm later agreed to arbitration of the dispute with Spiritas, after which
both parties agreed that Spiritas would refrain from seeking any addi-
tional permit applications and would refrain from pursuing further the
two such applications it had already filed."
On appeal, Spiritas argued "that the trial court should have issued a
TRO pending an evidentiary hearing on its request for temporary injunc-
tive relief because" without the TRO the town council was going to vote
on the actual annexation of the property before voting on the arbitrage
question, thus "mooting the controversy and extinguishing Spiritas's right
to arbitration under section 43.052(i). ' ' 12 "Section 43.052(c) of the Local
Government Code require[es] a municipality to create and make known
to the public a ... three-year annexation plan."' 13 A municipality is not
required to include sparsely populated and predominantly unimproved
land in such a three-year annexation plan, however. 14
The court determined that Little Elm still intended to engage in fast-
track annexation of Spiritas's property before conducting a hearing on
Spiritas's request for temporary injunctive relief; consequently the issue
was not moot, since the controversy regarding annexation before tempo-
rary injunction was still in existence. 15 The court then turned to the sub-
stantive issue at hand and held that "a party has a privately enforceable,
statutory right to arbitrate a dispute if it meets the requirements . . .
before fast-track annexation occurs."1 6 Once such annexation occurs, "a
landowner could not maintain a private action to disannex the prop-
erty." 1 7 Thus, if a municipality were allowed to proceed with annexation
of property on the fast-track while an arbitration request was pending, "a
municipality could effectively cut off a landowner's right to pre-annexa-
tion arbitration; a post-annexation arbitration would be moot, as the




12. Id. at 896.
13. Id. at 895 (citing TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 43.052(c) (Vernon 2008); JNC
Partners Denton LLC v. City of Denton, 190 S.W.3d 790, 792 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2006, pet. denied)).
14. TEX. Loc. GOv'T CODE ANN. § 43.052(h)(1) (Vernon 2008).
15. Id. at 897. The court's specific holding was:
Therefore, were we to dismiss this original proceeding as moot, the parties
would still be faced with the same live controversy: whether [Little Elm]
should be enjoined from taking steps to annex the property pending a hear-
ing on Spiritas's request for temporary injunctive relief, at which the trial
court will determine whether [Little Elm] should be enjoined from annexing,
or taking steps to annex, the property while arbitration is proceeding and
pending a final trial on the merits. [Little Elm's] refusal to refrain from at-
tempting to annex the property until then thus prevents this controversy
from being moot.
Id.
16. Id. at 898.
17. Id. (citing TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 43.141-.145 (Vernon 2008)).
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year plan." 18 Thus, the court held that "in order to preserve the status
quo," which TRO actions are designed to do, the "trial court should have
granted Spiritas's application for a TRO.' 19
Annexation was also at issue in Karm v. City of Castroville,20 involving
Olan Karm, a landowner who was negotiating with a developer for the
sale of a portion of his property. 21 In March 2004, Karm filed for volun-
tary annexation of his property into the City of Castroville ("Cas-
troville"). 22 In April 2004, "after two public hearings had been held,
Karm withdrew his consent for the voluntary annexation with the city.
23
In May 2004, Castroville annexed Karm's property despite such with-
drawal of consent. 24 After Castroville then denied the developer's re-
quest for a building permit, Karm and the developer filed suit requesting
that the city either grant the building permit or disannex the property.
25
Castroville annexed Karm's property pursuant to section 43.028 of the
Local Government Code.26 The statute requires that action on the peti-
tion for annexation occur between the fifth and thirtieth day after the
filing of the petition.27 A municipality must also have the landowner's
consent to act under that statute. 2
8
Castroville argued that, in setting the dates for the two public hearings
relating to Karm's property, it granted Karm's petition for annexation.
2 9
The court held that it was "unable to find any relevant authority support-
ing [Castroville's] position" and stated that it did not find the city's "ra-
tionale persuasive. "30 Because Castroville failed to comply with the
requirements of section 43.028, the annexation of Karm's property was
held to be void, the trial court's judgment was reversed, and judgment
was rendered for the appellants. 31
II. GOVERNMENTAL POWERS
In a conflict between the powers of a city and those of a county within
city limits, the city has greater authority, held the Austin Court of Ap-
18. Id.
19. Id. at 895, 898-99.
20. 219 S.W.3d 61, 62 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, no pet.).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 62-63.
24. Id. at 63.
25. Id.
26. Id. See also TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 43.028 (Vernon 2008) (authorizing "a
municipality to annex a certain sparsely occupied area upon petition of the landowner").
27. Karm, 219 S.W.3d at 63. The court stated:
After the fifth day following the date when the landowner filed the petition,
but on or before the thirtieth day, the annexing municipality must 'hear the
petition and the arguments for and against the annexation and shall grant or
refuse the petition as the governing body considers appropriate.
Id. (discussing § 43.028).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 62-64.
30. Id. at 64.
31. Id. at 63-65.
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peals in City of Laredo v. Webb County.32 When plans among the City of
Laredo ("Laredo"), Webb County, and the country of Mexico to con-
struct a fifth international bridge within the Laredo's city limits fell apart,
both Laredo and Webb County filed applications with the Texas Depart-
ment of Transportation for approval. 33 Webb County sought a declara-
tory judgment that it was authorized to build the bridge within city limits
without Laredo's consent. 34 Webb County also sought a declaratory
judgment that Laredo should not be allowed to withhold its consent, if
consent were required.35 The district court granted the declaratory judg-
ment, but did not address the consent withholding issue.36 Laredo filed
an appeal.37
"The establishment and control of public roadways is primarily a...
[state] function," observed the court, and the ability to delegate authority
to political subdivisions belongs to the legislature. 38 In order to deter-
mine whether the city or county had primary authority under chapters
364 and 367 of the Texas Transportation Code,39 the court would first
look to the plain meaning of the statutes. 40 The court concluded that
while chapter 364 plainly gave the county the authority to build an inter-
national bridge,41 chapter 367 plainly gave the same authority to the
city.42
In light of the city and county's overlapping authority, the issue was to
determine which political subdivision had superior authority, and
whether Webb County could build an international bridge "inside
[Laredo's] municipal limits, without [Laredo's] consent. ' 43 The court
held that in light of the absence of any clear statutory guidance, it would
rely upon the "well-established precedent that, within the boundaries of a
home-rule city, the municipality's roadway authority prevails over the
county's." 44
A county's authority, the court explained, is based upon a grant of spe-
cific power which must be made by the legislature or the Texas constitu-
32. City of Laredo v. Webb County, 220 S.W.3d 571, 578 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no
pet.).
33. Id. at 573-74.





39. TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. chs. 364, 67 (Vernon 2007 & Supp. 2008).
40. Laredo, 220 S.W.3d at 574.
41. Id. at 575 (noting that "it is undisputed that Webb County is authorized to con-
struct a toll bridge, as part of its road and bridge system, connecting the land within its
borders to Mexico over the Rio Grande") (footnote omitted).
42. Id. (noting that "it is also undisputed that the City of Laredo is authorized to con-
struct a toll bridge connecting the land within its borders to Mexico over the Rio Grande").
43. Id.
44. Id. (citing Tri-City Fresh Water Supply Dist. v. Mann, 142 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex.
1940) (orig. proceeding); City of Breckenridge v. Stephens County, 40 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex.
1931); Myers v. Martinez, 320 S.W.2d 862, 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1959), rev'd
on other grounds, 326 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1959)) (quotations omitted).
[Vol. 61
Local Government and Municipal Law
tion.45 Home-rule cities, by contrast, "do not depend on specific grants of
authority but, instead, have a constitutional right of self-government and
look to the legislature only for specific limitations on their power. ' '46
Consequently, upon incorporation, a home-rule municipality removes the
authority over its roads from the jurisdiction of the county.47 Addition-
ally, the court explained that the legislature gave cities express authority
over their roads. 48
The court highlighted additional provisions in the Transportation Code
and the Government Code which provide that, "a city must consent
before a county may finance roadway construction within the city's bor-
ders. ' 49 In addition, the court presumed that the legislature knew of-
and deliberately chose not to change-home-rule cities right of self-gov-
ernment, its superiority over the countys' rights within city limits, and the
fact that "to divest a home-rule city of its authority, the legislature must
speak with unmistakable clarity. '"50
Finding no such clear legislative intent to remove the home-rule city's
authority, the court turned to Webb County's argument that the
Supremacy Clause gives the United States Congress "exclusive jurisdic-
tion over international toll bridges."'51 The court explained that Con-
gress's grant of consent to any persons to build an international bridge
was limited by the requirement that the constructing party obtain the req-
uisite domestic and foreign approvals. 52 Section 201.612 of the Transpor-
tation Code requires that the constructing party obtain state approval
along with federal approval, meaning that the state does retain its regula-
tory authority.53 Such state and national authority can coexist and do not
conflict.54
In light of Laredo's clear and superior authority to regulate roadways
within its boundaries, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judg-
ment and rendered judgment that Webb County was not authorized "to
construct a toll bridge within the City of Laredo without [its] consent or
approval."55
45. Id. at 576.
46. Id.
47. Id. Specifically, the court explained that "[w]hen a town incorporates itself as a
home-rule city, it 'removes power from the [county] to lay out and regulate roads within
city limits,' and transfers that power to the governing body of the municipality." Id. (inter-
nal citations omitted).
48. See id. (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 311.001(a) (Vernon 1999)).
49. Id. at 578.
50. Id. at 580.
51. Id. at 582.
52. See id. Specifically, the court said, "Rather, to construct an international toll
bridge under this Act, the constructing party must obtain the approval of the proper au-
thorities in the foreign country concerned, the approval of the President; and, ultimately,
the approval of the Secretary of Transportation." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
53. Id. (citing TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 201.612 (Vernon 1999)).
54. Id. at 583.
55. Id. at 584.
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III. OFFICERS, AGENTS & EMPLOYEES
In the cases dealing with officers, agents, and employees of a munici-
pality, pleas to the jurisdiction are often at issue, because if (as the munic-
ipality alleges) the employee's claim is not valid or is otherwise subject to
a fatal procedural defect, governmental immunity typically deprives the
court of subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.56
In City of McAllen v. Zellers, forty-four officers filed suit against the
City of McAllen ("McAllen") based on a claim that the city did not pay
them for "standby duty."' 57 McAllen filed a plea to the jurisdiction based
upon a claim that the officers did not comply with the city's grievance
policy, thus leaving the district court without jurisdiction.58 McAllen as-
serted that its Police Department Handbook contained its grievance pro-
cedures and that failure to follow those procedures prior to bringing suit
would deprive a court of subject matter jurisdiction.59 While the Corpus
Christi Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Local Government Code
permitted the city to create a civil service commission authorized to settle
disputes between officers and the respective municipality, 60 the court
found that the city's grievance procedures did not match those within the
statute, and thus chapter 143 of the Local Government Code could not
serve as a basis for the city's plea to the jurisdiction. 61
The municipality's plea to the jurisdiction was held to be proper by the
Eastland Court of Appeals in City of Comanche v. Florence.62 Florence
was an employee of the City of Comanche ("Comanche") who had been
fired for insubordination.63 Florence filed suit against Comanche, alleg-
ing that she had been wrongfully terminated, based upon the premise that
the personnel manual that she was provided by Comanche constituted a
contract for employment.64 Florence alleged that such contract could be
classified under section 271.152 of the Local Government Code, which
provides a waiver of immunity from suit for certain breach of contract
services.65 If the manual was found not to be a contract, the city's gov-
ernmental immunity would not be waived. 66
56. See, e.g., City of Comanche v. Florence, No. 11-06-00285-CV, 2007 WL 2390781, at
*102 (Tex. App.-Eastland Aug. 23, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.).
57. City of McAllen v. Zellers, 216 S.W.3d 913, 914 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2007,
pet. denied).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 916.
60. TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE §§ 143.002(a), 143.001(a), 143.010 (Vernon 2008).
61. McAllen, 216 S.W.3d at 916. In particular, the court found:
However, the grievance procedures asserted ... in this case do not include
submission of the grievance to a civil service commission consisting of three
members appointed by [McAllen's] chief executive, as required by the local
government code.... Accordingly, chapter 143 of the local government code
does not serve as a basis for the [McAllen's] plea to the jurisdiction.
Id.
62. City of Comanche, 2007 WL 2390781, at *3.
63. Id. at *1.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *2 (citing TEX. Loc. GoVT CODE ANN. § 271.152 (Vernon 2005)).
66. See id. at *1. The court explained its reasoning as follows:
[Vol. 61
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The court declined to hold that section 271.152 of the Local Govern-
ment Code applied to the facts of the case, but accepted such assertion as
true for purposes of the appeal.67 Nonetheless, the court held that there
was no contract for employment because there was no agreement to
change Florence's at-will status; the express language in the manual
stated that "[n]othing contained in this manual is to be construed as a
guarantee or as a contract of employment; ' 68 and language in Florence's
employment application specifically stated the at-will nature of her em-
ployment. 69 Consequently, section 271.152 of the Local Government
Code did not apply to waive Comanche's immunity, and its issue on ap-
peal was sustained. 70
IV. PROPERTY-EMINENT DOMAIN, INVERSE
CONDEMNATION & TAKING
The Texas Supreme Court, in City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park
Properties, addressed whether the City of San Antonio ("San Antonio")
was allowed to exercise its police power by closing access between a pri-
vate driveway and a public street.71 In 1999, when San Antonio began its
efforts to address traffic problems surrounding a driveway within a com-
mercial business development, TPLP Office Park Properties, Ltd.
("TPLP") filed suit for injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment to
keep access to the driveway open.72 San Antonio counterclaimed that
the driveway and related traffic were a nuisance and that the driveway
violated traffic ordinances. 73
While the suit was pending, the San Antonio City Council passed an
ordinance that restricted the kinds of turns that could be made out of the
driveway.74 In 2001, the city passed another ordinance that "directed the
City Attorney 'to take any ... necessary action to ... close the street
access connection in question to vehicular traffic." 75
The trial court held that the attempted closure of the access from the
driveway onto the street would constitute an unreasonable exercise of the
city's police power, any reasonable exercise of police power should not
result in "material impairment" of the street access from the driveway,
closure of the street access would be a compensable taking, and the city
It is important to Florence's lawsuit against [Comanche] that the manual con-
stitutes a contract. If the manual does not constitute a contract, then her
employment is at-will. Further, if the manual does not constitute a contract,
then there is no possibility of waiver of governmental immunity and the trial
court would not have jurisdiction of this lawsuit.
Id.
67. Id. at *2.
68. Id. at *3.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. City of San Antonio v. TPLP Office Park Props., 218 S.W.3d 60, 61-62 (Tex. 2007).






was estopped as a matter of law from closing the street access.76 The
court of appeals found that there was sufficient evidence to support the
trial court's finding and affirmed the judgment below. 77
The supreme court recognized that, as a substantive due process issue,
any exercise of a city's police power must not be "arbitrary and unreason-
able."'78 In order to overcome a substantive due process challenge with
respect to property regulation, a city must demonstrate a "rational basis"
for its actions. 79 Under such standard, "[San Antonio's] decisions must
be upheld if evidence in the record shows it to be at least fairly debatable
that the decisions were rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest."80
The supreme court first noted that violation of an ordinance was not
required in order for the city to exercise its authority over its streets.81
The supreme court also considered whether San Antonio's closure of ac-
cess to the street via the driveway would constitute a compensable taking,
and concluded that no such taking would occur since alternative adequate
access to the street would remain.82 Finally, the supreme court held that
the issue of whether estoppel applied to the closure of the driveway due
to prior platting approvals was secondary to the fact that estoppel does
not apply when a city's ability to perform its governmental functions
would be restricted, as was the case here.83
V. REGULATION
The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's granting of
summary judgment dismissing a property owner's claims of negligence
and gross negligence against San Antonio in Park v. City of San
Antonio.84 In 1995, Park requested re-zoning for certain property he
owned within the city limits. Park obtained the necessary approvals and
built a clubhouse, batting cages, and a driving range.85 No special ap-
76. Id. at 63.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 64-65 (citing Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 938 (Tex.
1998)).
79. See id. at 65 (explaining that "[t]he U.S. Supreme Court has instructed that a
[c]ity's action with regard to property regulation will survive a substantive due process
challenge if it could have rationally been decided that the measure might achieve the
objective.").
80. Id.
81. See id. at 66. Specifically, the supreme court noted that "[San Antonio's] Charter
and the Transportation Code give the [cJity authority over city streets. Violation of an
ordinance is not required for the [c]ity to exercise this authority." Id.
82. See id. In deciding no taking had occurred, the supreme court reasoned that "di-
minished access is not compensable if suitable access remains.... If the access.., is closed,
at least six points of egress and ingress along the 1-10 access road will remain at the front of
the business park." Id.
83. See id. at 67 (holding that "even if doing justice would otherwise warrant applying
principles of estoppel, courts will not apply the doctrine if doing so interferes with a city's
ability to perform its governmental functions").
84. 230 S.W.3d 860, 864 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, pet. denied).
85. Id.
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proval was obtained for the property's fences, which were "twenty to
twenty-five feet high along the back of the property, and fifty feet high
along the sides."'8 6 San Antonio did, however, issue a Certificate of Oc-
cupancy for the business, including the fences.8 7
After receiving complaints from area residents about errant golf balls,
Park raised the fence without notifying the city.8 8 Park later applied to
the city for a permit to replace wooden poles with steel beams. But, San
Antonio denied the application and recommended that Park apply to the
San Antonio's Board of Adjustment for a variance and a permit to make
the changes.8 9
Before Park could follow the city's recommendation, San Antonio re-
codified its zoning and building regulations into the Uniform Develop-
ment Code ("UDC"). The UDC contained a six-foot height restriction
for fences. Park then requested a variance from the height restriction,
which was denied. 90 Park appealed the decision to a district court, which
remanded the case to the Board of Adjustment for reconsideration. The
Board of Adjustment denied the variance once again. Consequently,
Park made a decision to tear down the driving range fence and the driv-
ing range. Without the income from the driving range, the entire business
was foreclosed upon, and Park filed a lawsuit alleging that San Antonio
was negligent and grossly negligent in not warning Park about the new
height restrictions in the UDC. Park also asserted a claim for inverse
condemnation. In response, San Antonio filed a motion for summary
judgment based in part upon sovereign immunity, which the trial court
subsequently granted.
The court of appeals considered Park's inverse condemnation claim,
noting that a taking can be a physical taking or a regulatory taking.91
While physical takings are often readily apparent and identifiable as to a
specific parcel of property, "regulatory takings are ubiquitous and most
of them impact property values in some tangential way."'92 Any regula-
tory taking that causes a "physical invasion" of the property is grounds
for compensation without further analysis. 93 Regulatory taking also oc-
curs if all of the economic benefit of property is denied because of a par-
ticular regulation. 94 In order for such denial of economic benefit to rise
to the level of a regulatory taking, there must be no productive or eco-
nomically beneficial use of the land, and the effect of the regulation must




89. Id. at 864-65.
90. Id. at 865.
91. See id. at 867 (citing Lowenberg v. Dallas, 168 S.W.3d 800, 801 (Tex. 2005) (per
curiam)).






ability is not a compensable taking.96
"Finally, a compensable regulatory taking... occur[s] when a regula-
tion unreasonably interferes with the property owner's 'right to use and
enjoy the property." 97 According to Park, San Antonio's regulation and
the subsequent closure of the driving range caused him to suffer a greatly
diminished right to the use and enjoyment of his property. 98 In con-
ducting the analysis of Park's claim, the court noted that it would need to
"examine the totality of the relevant circumstances and balance the pub-
lic and private interests." 99
The court relied on Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York to analyze the relevant circumstances. 100 First, the court concluded
that the property retained some of its value despite the closure of the
driving range.101 After consideration of all of the relevant factors, the
court held that "the lack of economic information, partly due to Park's
inaction, weighs against him in the overall balance of public versus pri-
vate interest. 10 2 Next, the court considered the "historical uses" of the
property to determine whether "Park had a reasonable, investment-
backed expectation in the property. 10 3 The court concluded that at the
time San Antonio rezoned the property to have a six-foot height restric-
tion, Park did not have a reasonable, investment-backed expectation in
the property. 104 In fact, the court explained, Park initiated the problems
when he requested the zoning change. Thus, Park's own actions were
important in the court's final holding that no regulatory taking entitled to
compensation occurred. 105
VI. FISCAL MATT'ERS
Compliance with notice requirements was one of the central issues in
two interesting cases pertaining to fiscal matters during the Survey
period.
Houston Independent School District v. Old Farms Owners Associa-
tion 06 involved an appeal filed by certain taxing units to recover base
96. Id.
97. Id. (internal citations omitted).
98. Id. at 870.
99. Id. at 865.
100. Id. at 868-69 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
which established a three-factor test for finding a regulatory taking).
101. See id. at 869.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 870-71.
105. See id. The court further added:
There is no doubt that Park's situation is an unfortunate one. However, hav-
ing reviewed the totality of the facts and circumstances in light of the Penn
Central factors, we conclude that [San Antonio's] actions, following the re-
zoning, which Park requested, were not ones which should, 'in all fairness
and justice,' be paid for by the public.
Id.
106. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Old Farms Owners Ass'n, 236 S.W.3d 375 (Tex.
App.-Houston f[st Dist.] 2007, pet. filed).
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taxes plus penalties and interest for delinquent taxes owed on 4.3 acres of
real property.10 7 After a sale of a portion of the approximately 4.3 acre
tract by a trustee of the real property to the appellee in 1997, the ap-
praisal district sent a tax bill for the retained real property to the incor-
rect address for the trustee. The error was corrected in 1999, at which
time the taxing units filed suit against the trustee for the 1997 taxes. In
2000, the taxing units nonsuited the action against the trustee, but
brought suit again in 2002.108
The controlling statute in the lawsuit was section 33.04 of the Tax
Code.10 9 A 1985 amendment to that statute "required taxing units in
each year divisible by five to deliver by mail a written notice of delin-
quency to each person who owes a tax that has been delinquent more
than one year." 110 The statute was later amended in 2001 to state that "a
taxing unit's failure to deliver a delinquency notice [would] not result in
cancellation of penalties and interest."'1 1
The tax master who initially heard the case determined that the trustee
never received notice of the taxes and that penalties and interest were
waived because the trustee had never received a delinquency notice. 112
The taxing units appealed that decision to the district court, which
awarded the taxing units the full amount of taxes owed for the 1997 tax
year, but did not award any penalties or interest.1 1 3
The Houston First District Court of Appeals held that despite the fact
that the original lawsuit was filed in 1999, the 2001 amendment nonethe-
less applied because the nonsuit placed the parties in the position they
would have held had a lawsuit not been filed.'1 4 Consequently, the court
held penalties and interest were not canceled due to the taxing unit's fail-
ure to deliver the delinquency notice. 1 5
Noncompliance with notice requirements was the critical factor in the
decision of Austin Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's judgment
in Greater New Braunfels Home Builders Association v. City of New
Braunfels.116 The City of New Braunfels ("New Braunfels") adopted
subchapter C of chapter 402 of the Local Government Code (the "Act"),
which places limits on the charges that a city can levy to finance its drain-
age system.1 7 Section 402.045 also requires that "a public hearing be
held before levying drainage charges, [for which] notice [must] be pub-
lished three times before the hearing."' 1 8
107. Id. at 378.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 379; see TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 33.04 (Vernon 2008).
110. Old Farms Owners, 236 S.W.3d at 379.
111. Id. (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 380.
113. Id. at 380-81.
114. See id. at 381-82.
115. Id. at 382.
116. 240 S.W.3d 302, 309-10 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. denied).
117. Id. at 304.
118. Id. at 304-05 (citing TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 402.045(c)-(d) (Vernon 2005)).
2008]
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New Braunfels implemented the Act via several ordinances. Under an
ordinance adopted in May 2005, the city was allowed to collect a
"stormwater development fee," the revenues from which would be de-
posited into a "drainage utility fund ... used for the purpose of paying
the cost of the study, engineering, and design of a stormwater pro-
gram." 119 The October 2005 ordinance called for the collection of
"stormwater connection fees."'120 The "stormwater connection fee fund"
was to be used to pay for the cost of "the operation, administration and
maintenance of the utility drainage system and the cost of operation, re-
pair and maintenance of publicly owned right-of-ways and easements
whether natural or artificial which convey stormwater to the utility drain-
age system.' '1 2
1
When New Braunfels failed to comply with the notice and hearing re-
quirements of the Act when implementing the May 2005 and October
2005 ordinance, 122 it asserted that the fees were not "drainage charges"
implemented under the Act.12 3 The court, relying on the stated purpose
of the stormwater connection fee, determined that it was a drainage
charge.124 The court also determined that the stormwater development
fee was a drainage charge. 125 Despite the fact that the fees qualified as
drainage charges, the court held the portions of the relevant ordinances
that imposed the stormwater development fee and the stormwater con-
nection fee were invalid due to New Braunfels's failure to comply with
the Act's mandatory provisions.1 26
VII. ACTIONS
During the Survey period, the majority of governmental immunity
cases focused on construction and application of the holding in the water-
shed case, Tooke v. City of Mexia,127 which was discussed at length in this
article found in the Summer 2007 edition of The Annual Survey of Texas
Law.128 It bears repeating that in Tooke, the Texas Supreme Court over-
119. Id. at 305-06.
120. Id. at 306.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 306-07.
123. Id. at 308.
124. Id.
125. See id. at 308-09 (reasoning that "the stormwater development fee was imposed by
the May 2005 ordinance ... [which] expressly adopted [the ActI ... [and stated] uses of
the fee are also consistent with its being a drainage charge").
126. See id. at 310. The holding was as follows:
Because the City failed to comply with subchapter C's mandatory provisions
when imposing the drainage charges, we sustain the [plaintiffs'] first issue,
reverse the trial court's judgment, and render judgment that the portions of
the May 2005 ordinance, the October 2005 ordinance, and the November
2005 ordinance imposing the stormwater development fee and the
stormwater connection fee are invalid.
Id.
127. 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006).
128. Monica L. Coffey, Local Government and Municipal Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 1169,
1182-85 (2007).
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ruled its previous decision in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Brownsville
Navigation District129 (and its progeny), holding that the statutory lan-
guage "sue and be sued" did not represent a clear and unambiguous
waiver of immunity from sUit. 13 0 Not surprisingly, there were also a num-
ber of cases in the Survey period construing the limited waiver of immu-
nity allowed in 2006 by the Texas Supreme Court in Reata Construction
Corp. v. City of Dallas.1 31 This section will examine certain interesting
cases decided by the Texas Supreme Court and various Texas courts of
appeals in the wake of the 2006 Tooke and Reata decisions.
A. PROGENY OF TOOKE V. CITY OF MEXIA
In Bexar Metropolitan Water District v. Education and Economic De-
velopment Joint Venture,1 32 the San Antonio Court of Appeals considered
whether governmental immunity would bar a suit for specific perform-
ance of a contract to sell real estate. 133 In explaining that governmental
immunity from suit is not automatically waived when a governmental en-
tity enters into a contract, the court noted that one of the "fundamental
reason[s] why immunity exists [is] to prevent governmental entities from
being bound by the policy decisions of their predecessors." 13 4 As a result,
the state legislature, which can appropriately adapt to changing condi-
tions, is the appropriate body to waive immunity.135 The legislature's
control in the area of governmental immunity must remain intact; conse-
quently, any waiver of immunity "must be clear and unambiguous." 136
The court first analyzed whether governmental immunity would apply
to a suit for specific performance brought against a state official rather
than the state itself. In concluding that governmental immunity did ap-
ply, the court held that "such suits [seek] to control state action by impos-
ing liability on the State. '137
129. 423 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1970).
130. See Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 342. The supreme court stated that:
Missouri Pacific must be, and now is, overruled.... [T]he holding of Missouri
Pacific that 'sue and be sued', by itself, in an organic statute always waives
immunity from suit is simply incorrect.... Because the phrase means differ-
ent things in different statutes, it cannot be said to be clear and
unambiguous.
Id.
131. 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006).
132. 220 S.W.3d 25 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. dism'd).
133. Id. at 27.
134. Id. at 27 (quoting Catalina Dev., Inc. v. County of El Paso, 121 S.W.3d 704, 706
(Tex. 2003)).
135. See id. The court reasoned, "[w]e defer to the [l]egislature to waive immunity
because legislative control over sovereign immunity allows the [l]egislature to respond to
changing conditions and revise existing agreements if doing so would benefit the public."
Id. (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 332-33).
136. See id. (citing Tooke, 197 S.W.3d at 332-33) (internal quotations omitted).
137. See id. at 28. Stated in greater detail, the court held that "'suits against state offi-
cials seeking to establish a contract's validity, to enforce performance under a contract, or to
impose contractual liabilities are suits against the State. That is because such suits attempt
to control state action by imposing liability on the State." Id. (quoting Tex. Natural Res.
Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855-56 (Tex. 2002)).
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In light of Tooke, the court held that the statutory language in Bexar
Metropolitan Water District's ("Bexar Met's") enabling legislation that
Bexar Met could "sue and be sued in its corporate name" did not consti-
tute a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity.138 The court also held
that the same was true of a later amendment to the statute which con-
tained language authorizing "the bringing of a suit for contract damages
against a district only on a written contract of the district approved by the
district's board."'1 39 Such authorization, the court held, did not "expressly
waive immunity. [R]ather, the amendment creates a condition precedent;
if a suit for contract damages is otherwise authorized, it may be main-
tained only if the stated condition is met. 140
Finally, the court failed to find that Bexar Met waived immunity by
taking the procedural steps of praying for judgment and costs in the an-
swer it filed, filing a plea in abatement, and obtaining a continuance and
an order abating the case to pursue mediation.141 Such actions did not
constitute affirmative claims for relief such as those found in Reata Con-
struction Corp. v. City of Dallas.142 As such, they did not constitute a
waiver of immunity.1 43
In City of Houston v. Swinerton Builders, Inc.,144 the Houston First
District Court of Appeals held that the waiver of immunity found in sec-
tion 271.152 of the Local Government Code does not apply to a quantum
meruit claim.145 The court first examined the plain language of the stat-
ute, noting that terms excluded from a statute must be considered just as
much as the terms included therein.146 Section 271.152 provides a waiver
of immunity for adjudicating a breach of contract claim, but "lists no
other claims, either in law or in equity. '147 An examination of the legisla-
tive history of section 271.152 reveals that "the [1]egislature expressly
opted not to use the term 'arising under' in the final version of the stat-
ute."148 Such history indicates that there was no legislative intent to in-
clude other kinds of claims related to a breach of contract claim; rather,
"[t]he statute as enacted refers more narrowly to suits for the purpose of
adjudicating a claim for breach of the contract. 1' 49
The Houston First District Court of Appeals, in Texas Southern Univer-
sity v. State Street Bank & Trust Co., reaffirmed that declaratory judgment
138. Id. at 30.
139. Id. at 31 (quoting the statute).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 32.
142. 197 S.W. 3d 371, 377 (Tex. 2006).
143. Bexar, 220 S.W.3d at 32.
144. City of Houston v. Swinerton Builders, Inc., 233 S.W.3d 4 (Tex. App.-Houston
[lst Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
145. Id. at 7 (interpreting TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 271.152 (Vernon 2005)).
146. See id. at 12 (reasoning that "[in reading a statute, we give effect not only to the
terms used, but the terms that the legislature chose not to use in construing a statute").
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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suits that seek any redress under a contract are barred by immunity. 150
Just as a claim for contract damages may not be disguised as a claim for
declaratory judgment in an attempt to circumvent immunity, "a party
cannot circumvent the State's immunity from suit by recasting a contract
claim as one for inverse condemnation." 1 5 1 The court held that appellees
State Street Bank and Viron had not pled sufficient facts to establish the
requisite level of intent on the part of Texas Southern University to estab-
lish a constitutional takings claim. 152 Consequently, appellees' claim was
properly considered a contract claim and therefore barred by
immunity. 153
Additional analysis of the relationship between sovereign immunity
and declaratory judgment actions was provided in Texas Logos, L.P. v.
Texas Department of Transportation.1 54 Texas Logos, L.P. ("Texas
Logos") brought a declaratory judgment action under the Uniform De-
claratory Judgment Act ("UDJA") claiming that the Texas Department
of Transportation ("TxDOT") violated procurement statutes and that
their contract was void.1 55 After noting that a claim that a state agency or
officer has acted beyond statutory authority is properly decided under the
UDJA,1 56 the Austin Court of Appeals acknowledged that such an action
"does not implicate [sovereign] immunity.1 57 Nonetheless, sovereign
immunity is implicated when a party seeks to redress past statutory viola-
tions by the other party.15 8 Since the only remedy for correcting such
wrongs is to invalidate the contract, sovereign immunity applies, barring
such UDJA claims.159 Because Texas Logos's claims under the UDJA
150. Texas. S. Univ. v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 212 S.W.3d 893, 903 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). The court held the following:
[D]eclaratory-judgment suits against state officials seeking to establish a con-
tract's validity, to enforce performance under a contract, or to impose con-
tractual liabilities are suits against the State. That is because such suits
attempts to control state action by imposing liability on the State. Conse-
quently, such suits cannot be maintained without legislative permission.
Id.
151. Id. at 909.
152. Id. at 911.
153. Id.
154. 241 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no pet.).
155. Id. at 109.
156. Id. at 114.
157. Id. The court reasoned that "[wJe need not address whether or to what extent the
UDJA waives sovereign immunity here because the type of claims Texas Logos purports to
assert-declaratory claims to construe the statutory authority of a state officer or agency
alleged to be exceeding that authority-does not implicate sovereign immunity." Id. at
115.
158. Id. at 122.
159. See id. at 122-23. The court stated:
Even if sovereign immunity would not otherwise have barred Texas Logo's
declaratory claims if it had alleged ongoing statutory violations in the logo
sign procurement and sought to make TxDOT comply with these statutes,
Texas Logos alleges only past statutory violations, the 'only plausible rem-
edy' for which is the invalidation of the contract. Such a remedy, we have
seen, implicates sovereign immunity and bars Texas Logos', UJDA claims
challenging the logo sign and procurement contract.
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were barred, the court also held that its cause of action under section
2001.038 of the Administrative Procedures Act was barred, since sover-
eign immunity operated to bar any justiciable claim between the
parties. 160
While declaratory judgment actions or inverse condemnation claims
may not be used as a guise for contract claims,161 the converse is also
true: a party may not attempt to contract its way around a claim for which
immunity is statutorily waived. City of Carrollton v. Singer involved a
breach of contract action brought by the Singers against the City of Car-
rollton ("Carrollton"). 62 The facts revealed that, in response to a letter
from the city concerning the Singers' property, the Singers and Carrollton
entered into a contract for the conveyance of the Singers' right-of-way.
Dissatisfied with Carrollton's performance under the contract, the Sing-
ers later sued Carrollton for breach of contract, seeking money damages
and attorneys' fees. 163 Carrollton then filed a plea to the jurisdiction
based upon sovereign immunity. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals con-
cluded that sovereign immunity did not apply because the contract at is-
sue was, at its core, a settlement of an eminent domain claim.
164
Sovereign immunity does not apply to eminent domain claims, nor does it
apply to a contract based upon such eminent domain claims.
165
B. PROGENY OF REATA CONSTRUCTION CORP. V. CITY OF DALLAS
The common challenge presented to courts following the precedent set
by the Texas Supreme Court in Reata Construction Corp. v. City of Dallas
is to determine the nature of claims filed by a party claiming immunity.
166
In Reata, the Texas Supreme Court carved out a limited waiver of immu-
160. See id. at 123 (citing TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.038 (Vernon 2000)). The
court explained that "section 2001.038, like other causes of action, requires the existence of
a justiciable controversy to establish the district court's subject matter jurisdiction .... We
have held that sovereign immunity bars Texas Logos's UDJA claims to invalidate the con-
tract and protest order." Id.
161. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, 828-29 (Tex. 2007).
162. City of Carrollton v. Singer, 232 S.W.3d 790, 792 (Tex. App-Fort Worth 2007, pet.
denied).
163. Id.
164. See id. at 800. The court reached the following conclusion:
We conclude that [Carrollton] could not create immunity from suit for the
Singers' claim for adequate compensation by contracting to purchase their
property at an agreed upon valuation in fulfillment of the condition prece-
dent to filing an eminent domain proceeding in court as set forth in the prop-
erty code.
Id.
165. See id. The court held:
Accordingly, we hold that the agreement between [Carrollton] and the Sing-
ers was a settlement of an eminent domain proceeding in which the Singers
would have a claim against [Carrollton] for adequate compensation for [Car-
rollton's] acquisition of their property, and for which [Carrollton] would not
be immune. Therefore, [Carrollton] is likewise not immune to this subse-
quent action by the Singers for breach of that settlement agreement.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
166. Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 317 (Tex. 2006).
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nity by holding that where a governmental entity has inserted itself in the
midst of litigation, it may not claim immunity against any claims "ger-
mane to, connected with, and properly defensive to those asserted by the
governmental entity. 167
In construing the phrases "germane to" and "connected with," the
Houston First District Court of Appeals in Sweeny Community Hospital
v. Mendez first considered their common usage. 1 68 "'Germane' means
'closely akin,' 'being at once relevant and appropriate,' 'closely or signifi-
cantly related,' 'relevant,' and 'pertinent."' 169 The common usage of the
term "connected" is "'united, joined or linked.' 'joined together in se-
quence; linked coherently' and 'having parts or elements logically linked
together."' 170 The court held that since the parties' claims arose out of
the same transaction and had the same factual basis, Mendez's counter-
claims were germane to the breach of contract action filed by Sweeny
Community Hospital ("Sweeny"). 171 The court also held that Mendez's
counterclaims were "properly defensive to" Sweeny's claim.1 72
Although the court determined that Mendez's counterclaims should be
allowed, the court engaged in further analysis to determine whether the
counterclaims could stand on their own or whether they needed to be
restricted to the nature and extent of the original claims.1 73 If the coun-
terclaims, on their own, could overcome an immunity defense, then there
would be no restrictions placed on them. 174 However, the court held that
there was no relevant statutory waiver found under the Health and Safety
Code. 175 Thus, the scope of Mendez's claims for damages were limited to
the extent of an offset. 176
The Texas Supreme Court, in City of Galveston v. State, declined to
extend its holding in Reata holding to the facts of Galveston, which in-
167. Id. at 376-77.
168. Sweeny Cmty. Hosp. v. Mendez, 226 S.W.3d 584, 592 (Tex. App-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
169. Id. (citations omitted).
170. Id. (citations omitted)
171. See id. Specifically, the court held the following:
Here, Sweeny, not Mendez, initiated suit to recover for breach of contract.
Mendez thereafter filed counterclaims for breach of contract, fraud, tortuous
interference, defamation, and retaliation. Sweeny's claim and Mendez's
claims arise from the same transaction .... Resolution of the rights of the
parties depends on the facts pertinent to Sweeny's conduct regarding that
breach, and the added claims are thus germane to the matter in controversy.
Id.
172. See id. at 593-94. The court "decline[d] Sweeney's request to reverse the order of
the trial court and to dismiss Mendez's claim's for tortuous interference, defamation, and
retaliation because they act far in excess of an offset to the claims initiated by Sweeney."
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 596. The court held "that the Legislature did not manifest a clear legisla-
tive intent to waive the governmental immunity of governmental entities for retaliation
claims brought under section 161.135 of the Texas Health and Safety Code." Id. (interpret-




volved a suit by the State, on behalf of the Texas Department of Trans-
portation, against the home-rule city of Galveston. 177 In holding that
immunity would bar the State's claims, the supreme court noted that the
policy implications in the case at bar were different than those present in
Reata.178 Unlike a suit by the state against a private party, in a suit by the
state against a city the public is at risk of suffering if the state's actions are
unwise or improper. 179 The supreme court also pointed out the difficulty
in enforcing a judgment in such an action. 180 The supreme court ex-
plained that the issue of fundamental fairness weighs against allowing one
party to have governmental immunity and not the other.1 8 1 Finally, im-
munity is not the creation of the legislature; rather, it arose as a common-
law creation of the judiciary. 18 2 Consequently, the supreme court held, in
the absence of a clear and unambiguous legislative waiver of immunity,
"the same logic that created governmental immunity for cities protects
them from suits by the State for money damages.
183
177. City of Galveston v. State, 217 S.W.3d 466, 471-73 (Tex. 2007).
178. Id. at 473.
179. See id. The supreme court stated that "when the State sues a private party, the
general public stands to lose nothing; but when the State sues a city, a substantial part of
the public will no longer be shielded from the costs and consequences of improvident ac-
tions of their governments." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
180. See id. The supreme court explained that "there are jurisdictional problems in
asking courts to enforce a judgment against a government entity, even if it is a local one. If
the State can sue cities successfully, what will the courts do if the cities refuse to pay?" Id.
181. See id. Specifically, the supreme court said, "As we noted in Reata, it would be
fundamentally unfair to allow a governmental entity to assert affirmative claims against a
party while claiming it had immunity as to the party's claims against it." Id.
182. Id. at 473.
183. Id.
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